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ABSTRACT
Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-
known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and
patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, re-
searchers continue to find and exploit the same vulnerabilities in
old and new products, highlighting a big issue among vendors:
effectively tracking and fixing security vulnerabilities when disclo-
sure is not done directly to them. In this work, we present another
instance of this issue by performing the first library-wide SCA
security evaluation of Mozilla’s NSS security library. We use a com-
bination of two independently-developed SCA security frameworks
to identify and test security vulnerabilities. Our evaluation uncovers
several new vulnerabilities in NSS affecting DSA, ECDSA, and RSA
cryptosystems. We exploit said vulnerabilities and implement key
recovery attacks using signals—extracted through different tech-
niques such as timing, microarchitecture, and EM—and improved
lattice methods.
KEYWORDS
applied cryptography; public key cryptography; DSA; ECDSA; RSA;
side-channel analysis; lattice-based cryptanalysis; software secu-
rity; NSS; CVE-2020-12399; CVE-2020-12402; CVE-2020-6829; CVE-
2020-12401
1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, SCA security research involves manual analysis of
software libraries by actively triggering the execution paths of
cryptographic schemes in isolation, and measuring information
leaks. Constant-time software implementation is considered the
most widely adapted countermeasure against these information
leaks [43]. However, owing to a long list of SCA vulnerabilities in
popular software libraries such as OpenSSL [2, 10, 13, 35, 36], we
argue that for cryptographic library maintainers and developers,
manual verification for constant-time behavior is a non-trivial task,
and requires extensive knowledge about SCA security. This can
result in SCA vulnerabilities being overlooked by peer vendors,
especially when the issues are not directly reported to them.
A peer vendor is one that is “at the same horizontal level of the
supply chain; peer vendors may be independent implementers of
the same technology (e.g., OpenSSL and GnuTLS)” [20, p. 4]. In
the context of our work, NSS, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Li-
breSSL, mbedTLS,WolfSSL, etc. all fit this definition of peer vendors,
sharing the same market vertical, implementing (at least) several
versions of the TLS standard and many of the implied cryptographic
algorithms.
Inspired by documented multi-vendor security failures (detailed
later in Section 2.2), in this work we analyze the SCA security of
Mozilla’s NSS. OpenSSL’s rich history provides a large corpus of
security vulnerabilities, many of which are root caused to failure to
use constant-time algorithms. We leverage this corpus to explore
howwell NSS has kept upwithOpenSSL’s significant improvements
that accelerated after HeartBleed (CVE-2014-0160).
Taking NSS as our case study, we present a novel approach to
SCA security, by developing a systematic methodology for library-
wide automated identification of SCA leaks and flagging the vulner-
able execution paths. Our findings reveal serious SCA deficiencies
in NSS, which not only questions the current practice of vulnerabil-
ity disclosure among peer vendors, but more importantly provide a
general approach to automated SCA security validation for crypto-
graphic library developers. Furthermore, we also perform multiple
end-end attacks to highlight the severity of the discovered vulnera-
bilities and responsibly assist Mozilla to mitigate them.
Contributions. Briefly, the contributions of our work include: (i)
combining the DATA [52] and TriggerFlow [24] frameworks to
close the gap between identifying leakage and software / module /
unit / regression testing, subsequently applied to NSS (Section 3)
to discover, test, and exploit several novel vulnerabilities; (ii) an
end-to-end network-based remote timing attack against NSS’s DSA
implementation (Section 4); (iii) discovery of a traditional timing
attack vulnerability in NSS’s ECDSA implementation (Section 5) in
the context of nonce padding; (iv) an end-to-end ElectroMagnetic
Analysis (EMA) attack on NSS’s ECDSA implementation (Section 6)
in the context of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) scalar multipli-
cation; (v) an end-to-end microarchitecture attack on NSS’s ECDSA
implementation (Section 7) in the context of ECC scalar recoding;
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(vi) an end-to-end EMA attack on NSS’s RSA key generation imple-
mentation (Section 8); (vii) improved lattice methods and empirical
data for realizing several of these end-to-end attacks (Section 9).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Public Key Cryptography
DSA. Denote primes p,q such that q divides (p−1), and a generator
д ∈ GF (p) of multiplicative order q. The user’s private key α is an
integer uniformly chosen from {1 . .q − 1} and the corresponding
public key is y = дα mod p. With approved hash function Hash(),
the DSA digital signature (r , s) on messagem (denoting with h < q
the representation of Hash(m) as an integer) is
r = (дk mod p) mod q, s = k−1(h + αr ) mod q (1)
where k is a nonce chosen uniformly from {1 . .q − 1}.
ECDSA. Denote an order-q generator G ∈ E of an elliptic curve
group E with cardinality f q and q a large prime and f the small
cofactor. The user’s private key α is an integer uniformly chosen
from {1 . .q − 1} and the corresponding public key is D = [α]G.
With approved hash function Hash(), the ECDSA digital signature
(r , s) on message m (denoting with h < q the representation of
Hash(m) as an integer) is
r = ([k]G)x mod q, s = k−1(h + αr ) mod q (2)
where k is a nonce chosen uniformly from {1 . .q − 1}.
Point multiplication. During ECDSA signing, point multiplication
[k]G is the most computationally intensive part. For curves over
prime fields, windowed non-adjacent form (wNAF) is a textbook
method for performing point multiplication. Given a window size
w , and a set of pre-computed points ±G,±[3]G, · · · ,±[2w−1 − 1]G ,
the ℓ-bit scalar can be recoded as
k =
ℓ∑
i=0
ki2i where ki ∈ {0,±1,±3, · · · ,±(2w−1 − 1)}
The wNAF point multiplication method (Algorithm 2) scans signed
ki digits performing a point double at each step, whereas the posi-
tion of non-zero ki decides on point add. The wNAF representation
(Algorithm 1) reduces the number of non-zero scalar digits to about
ℓ/(w + 1), resulting in less point additions since it guarantees at
most one out ofw consecutive digits are non-zero.
Algorithm 1: Compute wNAF representation of k
Input: Integer k and widthw
Output:wNAF (k,w)
1 i = 0
2 while k , 0 do
3 if odd(k) then
4 d = k mod 2w
5 if d > 2w−1 then d = d − 2w
6 k = k − d
7 else d = 0
8 wNAF [i] = d , k = k/2, i = i + 1
9 returnwNAF
Algorithm 2: wNAF-based scalar multiplication
Input: Integer k , widthw and elliptic curve point G
Output: R = kG
1 ComputewNAF (k,w) using Algorithm 1
2 P[i] = iG ; i ∈ {−2w−1 + 1, . . ,−3,−1, 1, . . , 2w−1 − 1}
3 R = O
4 for i = ⌊lg(k)⌋ + 1 downto 0 do
5 R = 2R
6 if wNAF [i] , 0 then R = R + P[wNAF [i]]
7 return R
RSA. According to PKCS #1 v2.2 (RFC 8017 [32]), an RSA private
key consists of the eight parameters {N , e,p,q,d,dp ,dq , iq } where
all but the first two are secret, and N = pq for primes p, q. Public
exponent e is usually small and the following holds:
d = e−1 mod lcm(p − 1,q − 1) (3)
In addition, Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) parameters are
stored for speeding up RSA computations:
dp = d mod p, dq = d mod q, iq = q−1 mod p (4)
Currently, the minimum recommended length for N is 2048 bits
(i.e., p and q are 1024-bit primes) and e is fixed to a small value, typ-
ically 65537. Regarding RSA security, beyond traditional factoring
Coppersmith [15] showed if we know half of the bits of either p or
q it is possible to factor N in polynomial time, a fact we will utilize
later in Section 8.
During key generation, a typical check is coprimality of e with
both p − 1 and q − 1 often implemented with the binary extended
Euclidean algorithm (BEEA) [40]. Algorithm 3 (and variants) com-
putes the GCD of two integers a and b employing solely right-shift
operations (SHIFTS) and subtractions (SUBS) instead of divisions.
The BEEA control flow strongly depends on its inputs, and an SCA
capable attacker differentiating between SUBS and SHIFT opera-
tions can recover information on a and b [1, 3, 5, 35, 51].
In the context of RSA, the integer arguments will be e (public)
and p − 1 or q − 1, putting keys at risk. It is important to note that
step 4 will never execute since e is always an odd number, and that
during the first iterations v > u as p,q ≫ e .
2.2 Peer Vendors and Security Disclosure
Multi-vendor security disclosure is a practical challenge with peer
vendor competing products. Quoting [20, p. 20]: “Missing or poor
communication between peer vendors can negatively impact co-
ordination efforts.” The document goes on to give two illustrative
examples of security failures due to lack of peer vendor communi-
cation, which we extend with a third.
HTTP proxy poisoning. First publicly disclosed by R. L. Schwartz in
2001, by setting the (undefined) Proxy header in an HTTP request
to a malicious URL, per RFC 3875 [14] server-side CGI scripts will
translate this to the HTTP_PROXY environmental variable. This is
unfortunately a common environmental variable used by subse-
quent server-side scripts to configure outgoing proxy connections,
redirecting traffic to the malicious URL. Rediscovered several times
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Algorithm 3: Binary extended Euclidean algorithm (BEEA)
Input: Integers a and b such that 0 < a < b
Output: Greatest common divisor of a and b
1 begin
2 u ← a, v ← b, i ← 0
3 while even(u) and even(v) do
4 u ← u/2, v ← v/2, i ← i + 1
5 while u , 0 do
6 while even(u) do u ← u/2
7 while even(v) do v ← v/2
8 if u ≥ v then u ← u −v
9 else v ← v − u
10 return v · 2i
since, in 2016 “httpoxy” by D. Scheirlinck et al. led to over 14 CVE
assignments across different vendors1.
DNS cache poisoning. In 1999, D. J. Bernstein implemented UDP
source port randomization to harden dnscache (part of djbdns)
against DNS spoofing attacks2. Around that time, Bernstein made
a very clear and public argument that transaction ID randomiza-
tion was insufficient. In 2008, D. Kaminsky developed an exploit
around the concept3, resulting in CVE-2008-1447 that affected sev-
eral widely-deployed DNS solutions at the time, such as BIND and
Windows DNS.
Bit lengths can be secrets, too. In 2011, Brumley and Tuveri [13] de-
scribed a timing vulnerability present in OpenSSL’s implementation
of ECDSA that used Montgomery’s ladder as a scalar multiplication
algorithm for binary curves, exploited to steal the secret key of a
remote TLS server. The general message from the work was that
in nonce-based digital signature schemes, the effective bit length
of the nonce must also be kept secret. OpenSSL responded by issu-
ing CVE-2011-1945 and peer vendor Mozilla ported the patch that
landed in OpenSSL to NSS4. In 2019, “Minerva” by Jancar et al. [28]
revealed the vulnerability persists in many modern implementa-
tions leading to at least seven CVE assignments across vendors, and
similarly the recent “TPM-FAIL” byMoghimi et al. [31] withmore of
a hardware focus and CVE assignments by Intel (CVE-2019-11090)
and STMicroelectronics (CVE-2019-16863).
The three examples above are an illustrative range of porting
attack concepts to related products that implement similar stan-
dards. The first being closer to the traditional software security side,
the second more of an algorithmic attack, and the third (strongly
motivating our work) a side-channel attack. At a high level, the root
cause of all three examples is vendors failing to follow the advice
of security professionals and being blind to peer vendor activity
regarding security hardening.
1https://httpoxy.org/
2https://cr.yp.to/djbdns/forgery.html
3https://dankaminsky.com/2008/07/09/an-astonishing-collaboration/
4https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/079cfc4710c7193ef73888394f4d4f935e03f241
2.3 Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS)
With its roots in Netscape Navigator and SSLv2, NSS is a Free and
Open Source Software (FOSS) project tailored for Internet security
and interoperating security (e.g., TLS) and crypto (e.g., PKCS #11)
standards. The software suite consists of two libraries (libnss
along with Netscape Portable Runtime libnspr) and over 70 CLI
tools linking against them—e.g., certutil, pk1sign, p7sign, p7verify,
signtool, etc.
Mozilla maintains the development infrastructure for NSS and
is the main contributor due to the history of the project, as well as
Firefox’s significant browser market share. Yet currently Red Hat
is also a major contributor due to their server-side enterprise use
cases, and over the years other contributors include Sun Microsys-
tems/Oracle Corporation, Google, and AOL.
Below the TLS layer, what differentiates NSS from other crypto-
featured security software libraries is its abstraction of crypto-
graphic operations. It features native PKCS #11 support for hard-
ware and software security modules. In fact, at the API level, this is
the interface at which linking applications drive the crypto—NSS
serves crypto operations backed either externally through a PKCS
#11 hardware token, or (by default) internally through its own PKCS
#11 software token. This is different from all other major libraries,
e.g., OpenSSL which provides access to crypto functionality either
through its EVP interface (modern) or directly through low level
APIs (legacy).
The comparison between NSS and OpenSSL is important due
to the shared history and evolution of the projects. In particular,
starting in 2001 Oracle (then Sun Microsystems) made fundamental
FOSS contributions by integrating their ECC software into both
projects5, a new feature for both libraries. In that respect, the ECC
parts of both libraries are forked from the same original code [26],
yet have evolved independently over the last two decades.
NSS and SCA: previous work. Over the years NSS has had its fair
share of cryptography implementation issues leading to several
practical attacks on multiple primitives—some of these attacks are
algebraic in nature such as RSA signature forging [33], DH small
subgroup attack [45], and Lucky13 [7], just to name a few. In 2017,
Yarom et al. [54] demonstrated that cache-bank conflicts leak timing
information from an otherwise constant-time modular exponenti-
ation function implemented in NSS, leading to RSA key recovery
after observing 16000 RSA decryptions. In 2018, Ronen et al. [37]
performed a padding oracle attack against RSA following the PKCS
#1 v1.5 standard to recover long term login tokens used during TLS
connections. Although this attack is well-known, the authors used
recent SCA cache-based attack techniques, successfully reviving
an old vulnerability. Finally, in 2019 Ryan [38] included NSS in his
analysis of a new SCA attack enabled by a variable-time modular
reduction function used during signature generation, allowing an
attacker to recover ECDSA and DSA private keys.
2.4 Related Attacks
CVE-2016-2178. OpenSSL assigned this CVE based on work by
Pereida García et al. [36]. The authors performed a cache-timing
attack using the Flush+Reload technique against a variable-time
5https://seclists.org/isn/2002/Sep/89
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sliding window exponentiation algorithm used during DSA signa-
ture generation, leading to full secret key recovery of OpenSSH
and TLS servers co-located with an attacker. This vulnerability was
present in the code base for more than 10 years and was enabled
by a seemingly small software defect.
CVE-2018-0737. OpenSSL assigned this CVE based on work by Al-
daya et al. [5]. The authors detected and identified several paths
during RSA key generation potentially leaking information about
the algorithm state. The authors performed a single trace cache-
timing attack over the corresponding GCD function combining
different techniques (including lattices) to achieve full secret key
recovery.
CVE-2018-5407. OpenSSL assigned this CVE based on work by Al-
daya et al. [2]. The authors discovered a novel timing SCA attack
vector leveraging port contention in shared execution units on
Simultaneous Multi Threading (SMT) architectures. With a spy
process running in parallel, they targeted the variable-time wNAF
point multiplication algorithm during ECDSA signature generation
and recovered the secp384r1 long term private key of a TLS server.
Prior to the CVE and work done by Tuveri et al. [43], this imple-
mentation was the default choice for most prime curves, which was
subsequently replaced by a timing resistant version.
2.5 Leakage Detection and Assessment
Differential Address Trace Analysis (DATA). This is a framework that
detects potential side-channel leaks in program binaries; Weiser
et al. [52] used the framework to analyze OpenSSL and PyCrypto.
DATA works by observing the program execution with known
and different inputs using Intel Pin6, then analyzing the execution
traces to detect differences in flow caused by different input, thus
highlighting potential SCA vulnerabilities. This approach makes
it mostly automated and universal with respect to SCA method.
DATA led to the discovery of CVE-2018-0734 and CVE-2018-0735
issued by OpenSSL [50].
Triggerflow. This is a tool to selectively track code-path execution
[24], facilitating testing-based SCA of cryptography libraries such
as OpenSSL and mbedTLS [5, 22]. The power of Triggerflow comes
from its simplicity, allowing a user to annotate source code by plac-
ing Points of Interest (POIs) and filtering rules, thus supporting false
positive filtering. Then, Triggerflow compiles the source code, and
runs a list of user-supplied binary invocations called “triggers”, re-
porting context whenever a trigger reaches any of the user-defined
POIs. Triggerflow can be adapted to Continuous Integration (CI) of
the development pipeline for automated regression testing. Trig-
gerflow does not support automatic POI detection, instead relying
on other offensive methodologies and tools [18, 25, 52].
3 NSS: AN SCA SECURITY ASSESSMENT
In this section, we combine DATA [52] for SCA POI identification
with Triggerflow [24] for extended POI testing. We apply this com-
bination to assess the SCA security of NSS, in particular for its
public key cryptography primitives.
6https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/pin-a-dynamic-binary-instrumentation-
tool
DATA frameworks. DATA requires a “framework” for program analy-
sis—a Bash script defining commands necessary to prepare the
environment, run the program with given inputs and optionally
supply a leakage model. The script uses a library included in DATA
and supplies its own domain-specific callbacks. The end result is
a script which accepts parameters such as algorithm, key size and
processing phase, and runs DATA.
An NSS framework for DATA. For NSS, we created a framework an-
alyzing signature creation with DSA, ECDSA, and RSA algorithms.
First, we define DATA callback cb_prepare_framework which cre-
ates the NSS certificate storage if it does not exist yet. The storage
includes an SQLite database storing all certificates generated by
command-line tools. This callback runs in the beginning of every
framework invocation. Second, we define cb_genkey which gener-
ates key pairs and certificates for a given algorithm using the NSS
utility certutil. For RSA and DSAwe use default key size, for DSA
default parameters, and for ECDSA curves secp256r1, secp384r1,
and secp521r1—the only legacy curves NSS features. The callback
executes every time DATA needs a different key. Finally, for DATA
analysis we sign a fixed small piece of data using the NSS utility
pk1sign in the callback cb_run_command traced by DATA.
Supporting DATA code allows us to define all algorithms in a
single file, using algorithm-specific code depending on arguments
given in framework invocation. In our case, the only difference
was the algorithm selection during creation of the certificate. The
DATA software package includes example frameworks, as well as
working frameworks for OpenSSL and PyCrypto.
Performance evaluation. We performed our experiments on an Intel
Xeon Silver 4116 (Skylake) with 256 GB RAM. At peak, DATA
framework consumed 120 GB memory to analyze the program. The
exact amount depends on the stage and algorithm. High memory
requirements and general resource consumption make it unsuitable
for automated testing, but still an extremely useful offensive tool
for vulnerability research.
Results. DATA output is a collection of potential leaks. It stores the
leak data in XML, as well as in Python standard “pickle” serializa-
tion format. The included GUI can read this format, and includes
tools for marking leak points for further review, as well as adding
comments. Table 1 presents our aggregate DATA statistics, where
the “Total” rows include also SQLite and/or other less relevant
parts of NSS while (statically-linked, private) libfreebl handles
the crypto arithmetic in NSS.
Combination of DATA and Triggerflow. DATA can help quickly de-
termine areas of the code vulnerable to SCA, but it is—as shown
before—expensive to run and this is unsuitable for automated test-
ing. Thus, we combine DATA and Triggerflow in vulnerability
research: first, we detect vulnerabilities once using DATA analysis,
then we mark vulnerable areas with Triggerflow annotations and
continuously and cheaply monitor the code for SCA vulnerabilities.
This hybrid approach combines assisted vulnerability scanning of
DATA and automatic inexpensive monitoring by Triggerflow. The
approach is general and applicable to any library supported by the
tools, so it can be applied to other cryptographic libraries as well.
Déjà Vu: Side-Channel Analysis of Mozilla’s NSS
Table 1: Statistics for our NSS framework in DATA.
Algorithm Location CF leaks Data leaks
DSA libfreebl 0 446
DSA Total 2443 7435
ECDSA libfreebl 0 1074
ECDSA Total 2124 5890
RSA libfreebl 666 804
RSA Total 3593 11140
Table 2: Summary of SCA attacks.
SCA
attack
Vulnera-
bility
Target
device
Application
layer
Threat
model
DSA timing
(Section 4)
Nonce
padding
Raspberry
Pi3
Time Stamp
Protocol
Remote
ECDSA timing
(Section 5)
Nonce
padding
Intel
i7-7700
NSS pk1sign Local
ECDSA Electromag-
netic (Section 6)
Point mul-
tiplication
Allwinner
Pine A64
Time Stamp
Protocol
Physical
proximity
ECDSA uarch
(Section 7)
Scalar
recoding
Intel
i7-7700
NSS pk1sign
(SGX)
Local, mali-
cious OS
RSA Electromag-
netic (Section 8)
Key gener-
ation
Allwinner
Pine A64
NSS
certutil
Physical
proximity
Producing Triggerflow annotations from DATA results. Using the in-
formation from DATA GUI to guide manual code review, we deter-
mined the most critical areas of NSS potentially vulnerable to SCA.
Next, we annotated each area with Triggerflow’s TRIGGERFLOW_-
POI, further refined with TRIGGERFLOW_IGNOREwhen running mul-
tiple operations on annotated source code to eliminate false posi-
tives. This allows us to examine potential vulnerabilities in context,
and led to several concrete vulnerabilities summarized in Table 2
and described in detail in the following sections. We further point
out that in all the attacks, NSS library was compiled with debug
symbol enabled while keeping the default configurations intact.
Section 4–Section 8 present a more detailed description of the ex-
periment environments and threat models.
Case study. A good example of this workflow is the vulnerability
described later in Section 6. DATA correctly flagged the problematic
line in ec_compute_wNAF (Figure 3), as well as 93 other potential
data leaks. Inspecting the leak data in DATA GUI showed that all
vulnerable places converge in the parent ec_GFp_pt_mul_jm_wNAF,
which is suitable as a Triggerflow POI. After running Triggerflow
NSS configuration, pk1sign triggered the annotation once for both
curves secp384r1 and secp521r1. This annotation could be in-
cluded in an automatic SCA regression test for NSS.
4 DSA: LEAKAGE MEETS CONSTANTNESS
As mentioned previously, after [13] OpenSSL and several peer ven-
dors decided to apply the nonce fixed bit length countermeasure
to their code base. Unfortunately, this fix did not permeate to the
DSA portion of NSS, leaving the library vulnerable to this flaw at
least since 2011. We speculate that a very regular fixed window
exponentiation (FWE) algorithm paired with constant-time cache
access to pre-computed values provided a false sense of security,
forgetting that the nonce requires its own protection against bit
length leakage due to the fragility of the DSA algorithm w.r.t. SCA.
Analysis. Our tooling revealed the main root cause of the time leak-
age was directly attributed to the variable bit length of the nonce
k during the computation r = дk mod p (Equation 1) in the upper
level dsa_SignDigest function. Helped by leakage amplification in
lower-level exponentiation functions, this flaw leaks a considerable
amount of information on the MSBs of the nonce. To better under-
stand the time leakage, we can highlight three important functions
in the NSS library, from general to more specific: (i) The dsa_Sign-
Digest function contains the logic to calculate the digital signature
pair (r, s) by calling the corresponding high-level modular arith-
metic functions; (ii) The mp_exptmod function is a wrapper function
selecting a specific modular exponentiation function among several
available based on input values and flags set during compilation
time—additionally it determines the window size to be used by the
exponentiation function; (iii) The mp_exptmod_safe_i function
computes and implements a cache-timing safe regular FWE algo-
rithm based on the window size selected by the previous wrapper
function.
After calculating the window size and just before calling the
FWE function, the wrapper function modifies the bit length of the
exponent by making it a multiple of window size. Thus, artificially
increasing the amount of bits in the exponent and therefore the
amount of windows to be processed by the FWE function. This
means the leakage potentially occurs in multiples of the window
size, reveling a total ofw · i MSBs for each signature, wherew is the
window size, and i is the amount of windows skipped by the FWE
due to shorter-than-average nonces. Therefore, the FWE function
effectively amplifies the leakage and improves the resolution by
widening the time gap it takes to process variable length exponents
coming from the upper-level DSA signing function.
4.1 DSA: Remote Timing Attack
To demonstrate concretely the impact of the vulnerability, we ex-
ploit it remotely from the application layer through the Time Stamp
Protocol defined in RFC 3161 [55] as implemented in uts-server7.
The Time Stamp (TS) Protocol permits a trusted Time Stamp Au-
thority (TSA) to digitally sign a piece of data—e.g., using DSA or
ECDSA—confirming the data existed at that particular point in time,
and allowing anyone with access to the TSA certificate to verify
the timeliness of the data.
Target device. We used a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B plus board contain-
ing a 1.4 GHz 64-bit quad-core Cortex-A53 processor. The device
runs stock Gentoo 17, and we set the board frequency governor to
“powersave”. We deployed uts-server on the target device, acting
as the TSA, receiving TS requests over (the default) HTTP and
generating TS responses.
The only supported backend cryptography library for uts-ser-
ver is OpenSSL, therefore we use an OpenSSL loadable crypto-
graphic module (engine) [42] to expose NSS DSA signature genera-
tion to the server. In general, the purpose of engines is to intercept
7https://github.com/kakwa/uts-server
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OpenSSL low-level crypto functionality and carry out the opera-
tions internal to the engine, either HW or SW-backed. The e_nss8
OpenSSL engine makes the use of NSS transparent to linking appli-
cations, in our case uts-server.
As an FOSS contribution, we submitted a PR to the uts-server
project adding engine-backed key support, e.g., devices such as
TPMs, HSMs, or generically PKCS #11 driven. In these instances,
the key never leaves the device hence cannot be directly access by
OpenSSL, only driven. Our contribution9 addresses a three year old
outstanding feature request on the project’s issues page. In our case,
this allows uts-server to transparently utilize the crypto func-
tionality of NSS through e_nss and keys inside the NSS keystore
through NSS’s PKCS #11 software token view.
We patched, compiled, and deployed the latest uts-server v0.2.0,
linking against an unmodified build of OpenSSL 1.1.1. We compiled
and deployed an unmodified version of e_nss, linking to both—the
previous OpenSSL build and an unmodified build of NSS v3.51,
effectively transparently connecting the server to NSS through
OpenSSL.
Experiment setup. On one end we deployed the TS server on our RPi,
on the other end we deployed a custom TS client on a workstation
equipped with a 3.1 GHz 64-bit Intel i5-2400 CPU (Sandy Bridge),
both communicating through a Cisco 9300 series enterprise switch
over Gbit Ethernet. The workstation has 4x1 Gbit link aggregation
to the switch and the RPi a single Gbit connection to the switch. Our
custom client is a simple rust program that embeds a TS request in
an HTTP request, establishing a TCP connection to the server, and
starting a timer just before sending the request. The uts-server
actively listens for TS requests and generates corresponding TS
responses using NSS transparently through OpenSSL, replying back
to the client as soon as the TS response is available. Once the TS
response is received, the client stops the timing, closes the TCP
connection, computes the latency, and finally stores the latency and
the TS response pairs in a database. This operation is repeated as
needed to gather more samples. Following the attack methodology
from previous remote attacks [13, 22, 31], we divided our attack in
two phases.
Collection phase. We collected 218 samples using our custom client,
and our timing analysis confirmed that our vulnerability analysis
was correct—a direct correlation existed between the wall clock
execution time of DSA signature generation and the bit length
of the nonce used to compute the signature. We confirmed the
nonce values using the ground truth private key from the NSS
keystore. More importantly, Figure 1 shows that the time leakage is
substantial, allowing an attacker to exploit the vulnerability even
in a remote scenario.
Recovery phase and results. Section 9 describes in detail the lattice
construction formalization, lattice parameters, lattice experiments,
and results applied to our collected samples. In short, we observed
a striking 99% (1536 samples) and 38% (1152 samples) success rate
for recovering private keys in our remote timing attack scenario
after performing a lattice attack.
8https://roumenpetrov.info/e_nss
9https://github.com/kakwa/uts-server/pull/15
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Figure 1: DSA time leakage in NSS on a remote scenario. Di-
rect correlation between DSA signature generation time and
bit length of the nonce.
5 ARE YOUR NONCES REALLY PADDED?
In a nutshell, CVE-2011-1945 exploited the Montgomery ladder
feature that it executes an iteration per scalar (i.e., ECDSA nonce
k) bit, performing both double and add ECC operations regardless
of said nonce bit value. This regularity offers protection against
classical SCA that aims at recovering the nonce by tracking the
sequence of ECC operations [29]. However as demonstrated in [13]
this feature plays in favor of a timing attacker.
This highly regular feature combined with the fact that this algo-
rithm executes ⌈lgk⌉ − 1 iterations implies that the execution time
is highly related to the effective bit length of k [13, 43]. Therefore, a
timing attacker could learn information on k by measuring the exe-
cution time during ECDSA signature generation, with computing
time dominated by the scalar multiplication.
In order to prevent this attack, Brumley and Tuveri [13] proposed
a countermeasure that fixes the number of significant bits of the
nonce using (5).
kˆ =
{
k + 2q if ⌈lg(k + q)⌉ = ⌈lg(q)⌉
k + q otherwise
(5)
In response to this research and CVE-2011-1945, the nonce padding
countermeasure based on (5) has been implemented not only in
OpenSSL, but in other libraries as well. Mozilla NSS included the
nonce padding countermeasure in 2011 in their high-level ECDSA
function10. However, despite this intended fix, we uncovered the
implemented countermeasure is ineffective. We found that after
the padding, a lower-level scalar multiplication function reduces kˆ
modulo q, thus reverting the nonce to its original value (Line 2511).
This nonce unpadding opens the door to a timing attack against
NSS. The library has different scalar multiplication algorithms im-
plemented. For curve secp256r1 it uses a constant-time scalar
multiplication algorithm, yet a wNAF implementation for higher
security curves secp3841 and secp521r1. This algorithm iterates
through wNAF digits of the scalar, and the number of iterations
depends on the wNAF representation length, eventually depending
on lg(k). Therefore a timing attacker could learn information about
k by measuring the duration of ECDSA signature generation.
10https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/079cfc4710c7193ef73888394f4d4f935e03f241
11https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/c06f22733446c6fb55362b9707fa714c15caf04e/
lib/freebl/ecl/ecl_mult.c
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Figure 2: ECDSA timing cdf per nonce bit-length.
Experimental validation. In order to validate this hypothesis, we
developed a proof-of-concept to demonstrate that the execution
time of NSS wNAF scalar multiplication is related to lg(k). For
this experiment we build NSS v3.51 on an Ubuntu 18.04 LTS desk-
top workstation running on Intel i7-7700 3.60GHz (Kaby Lake).
We measured the number of clock cycles consumed by the NSS
library exported function for generating digital signatures: Sign-
Data. Our previous analysis (Section 3) reveals this function’s call
trace includes ec_GFp_pt_mul_jm_wNAF forw = 5 in the context of
secp384r1. We collected 1M samples of SignData latency during
ECDSA signature generation. Using the ground truth private key
from the NSS keystore, we computed the secret nonces used in each
signature, then estimated the cdf curves of the latency per effective
bit length.
Figure 2 shows these curves, aggregating those ℓ ≤ 380 in one
single curve. This empirically demonstrates there is indeed a depen-
dency between lg(k) and the time taken to produce an secp384r1
ECDSA signature in NSS. With enough samples under the right con-
ditions, we speculate this leak could be exploited using the lattice
methods developed in Section 9, as demonstrated in [22].
6 LEAKING ECDSA KEYS THROUGH EMA
In general, wNAF has been subjected to a variety of SCA attacks
on OpenSSL in the past—e.g., L1 and LLC cache timings [10, 12],
EM [22, 23] and port contention [2]. As far as we know, we are the
first to practically demonstrate an end-to-end attack on NSS wNAF
implementation. To this end, we employed EMA to exfiltrate the
ECDSA private key. Previous EM attacks on wNAF focused on only
retrieving least significant bit positions [8, 22, 23]. In contrast, out
attack uses an advanced multi-digit lattice formulation detailed in
Section 9.2, making it possible to potentially use the entire EM trace
to extract side-channel information, consequently, lowering the
number of signatures required and reducing the data complexity of
the attack.
Threat model. We assume an adversary is able to obtain a similar
device to learn about the particular EM leakage (preparation phase),
and furthermore gain access to close proximity of the target de-
vice while issuing ECDSA queries (attack phase). This model is
consistent with the literature.
Experiment setup. Our setup includes a Pine A64-LTS powered by
a 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex A53 SoC. This target hardware
device runs Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS minimal with NSS v3.51. Similar
to Section 4, we created a TS server instance using uts-server
as our victim, this time with an secp384r1 key. We measured the
EM signals using a Langer LF-U 2.5 EM probe attached to a 40 db
preamplifier, with the probe head positioned close to the target
board to achieve good signal strength. We acquired the EM traces
using a Picoscope 6404C USB digital oscilloscope with a maximum
sampling rate of 5GSps supporting up to 500MHz bandwidth. To
strike balance between lower computational cost and decent signal-
to-noise ratio, we used a sampling rate of 150MSps instead.
Signal acquisition. We created a client responsible for sending TS
requests over HTTP to our server and controlling the oscilloscope.
The client first initiates the trace capture command followed by
a TS request, then stopping the trace capture upon receiving the
HTTP response from the server. We parsed the server response
messages to retrieve DER encoded ECDSA signatures and the hash
from the client request. The resulting EM traces along with their
parsed ECDSA information were stored for offline signal processing
and key recovery phase.
Signal processing. For a successful signing key recovery, the EM
traces must go through signal processing to reliably extract the
partial nonce information. From the signal analysis perspective,
these partial nonces are encoded as the sequences of double and
add operations during wNAF point multiplication as observed in
the EM trace (Figure 3). Using this partial information from mul-
tiple signatures we can formulate a lattice attack as described in
Section 9.2.
Since the captured trace contained the entire TS request window,
the first step involved in locating and isolating the ECDSA point
multiplication part. By performing a manual analysis, we found
specific patterns in the trace pertaining to the start and end of the
point multiplication. We used these as the templates (created by
averaging over 20 EM traces) to cut the point multiplication window
using squared Euclidean distances between root mean square values
of the trace and template.
We then moved to the next phase, extracting the double and
add sequences. This was a two-step process: finding the position
of all the add operations and then finding all double operations
between them. By performing a spectrum analysis we found clearly
distinguishable low energy point multiplication double loop (D) and
higher energy double and add loop (DA). To improve the detection
we extracted two components of the signal: a band pass around 15
MHZ and a low pass at 5Mhz for the DA and D loops respectively.
We demodulated them using a digital Hilbert transform and applied
signal smoothing filter.
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Figure 3: EMA trace showing part of the wNAF point mul-
tiplication with marked double (D) and add (A) operations.
The filtered trace clearly shows two distinguishable loops:
lower energy D and higher energy DA.
Using the first signal component, we extracted the DA loops
using a similar approach to the point multiplication extraction, i.e.,
compute rolling squared Euclidean distances using the DA tem-
plate. The D sequences were present in the signal as voltage peaks,
however due to noisy artifacts in the trace simply extracting the
peaks resulted in both false positive and negative peaks. Since each
wNAF loop iteration performs only one double operation between
two DA loops, they follow an almost periodic trend. Using this in-
formation together with the fact that D peaks can be approximated
to rectangular pulses using root mean square, we computed pulse
width to period ratios. By selecting an experimentally evaluated
threshold for these ratios we were able to significantly increase the
detection of the D loops with an overall error rate of less then 1%.
In practice, EM traces contain noise from various sources—OS
preemption, acquisition noise, environmental and electrical noise—
which can reduce the efficacy of signal processing phase. OS in-
terrupts for instance are high energy signals and therefore easily
distinguishable. We marked all such interrupts in the trace and
recovered the sequence from the interrupt position till the end of
the trace (i.e., interrupt to wNAF LSD). For other noise sources
and small interrupts our sequence extraction resulted in around 6%
of the total traces with less then 1% incorrect guess for D and/or
AD loops. Additionally, we applied heuristics on the recovered
sequences to filter those which violated the wNAF encoding rules.
In total we collected 300 signatures, which left us with 211 sig-
natures after performing sequence extraction, containing 13 errors.
We filtered out the sequences with a length of at least 384, which
resulted in a total of 66 signatures. By using our lattice formulation,
we were able to recover the private key with as few as 30 signatures
as described Section 9.2. A clear advantage of using more informa-
tion per trace is reflected in the low number of signatures required.
To put this into perspective, the ECDSA attack presented by [23]
utilized only LSDs of the nonce (last non-zero digit and trailing
zeros), required 3060 signatures and even the secp256k1 curve at
a substantially lower security level.
7 UARCH SCA ON SCALAR RECODING
This section presents an SCA attack that aims at recovering the
wNAF representation of an ECDSA nonce, similar to Section 6 that
targeted the ECC operation sequence. We instead target the wNAF
recoding itself (Algorithm 1). This target, in addition to representing
a novelty as it is not a common target in the literature, represents a
challenge due to its low temporal and spatial granularity as detailed
later. Moreover, we will be able to recover the same information
as in Section 6. Additionally, employing the same channel we will
gain extra information on the wNAF representation, recovering the
sign of its non-zero coefficients.
Threat model. Although Section 6 and this section aim at recovering
very related data, their threat models and targets differ significantly,
therefore they are distinct attacks. Controlled channel attacks be-
long to a class of threat models when the adversary has control over
the targeted computing platform except the targeted algorithm it-
self and its processed secrets [53]. One instance of this threat model
is provided by trusted executed environments (TEEs), like Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) on Intel microprocessors [16]. In
Intel SGX nomenclature, an enclave is software running on a secure
space that provides confidentiality and integrity of enclave code
and data, even in presence of a compromised OS (i.e., adversary).
However, it delegates SCA protections to developers, allowing at-
tackers to use privileged OS resources when gathering SCA signals
that reveal information on enclave secrets.
Intel SGX leaves control of memory pages to the OS, which
an adversary can use to track the sequence of executed memory
pages by a targeted enclave [39, 47, 49, 51, 53]. An attacker first
marks a memory page with SCA relevance as non-executable and
launches the enclave. If the enclave executes that memory page,
a page fault is generated and handled by the OS (i.e., adversary),
hence the attacker learns the targeted memory page was executed
[53]. Applying this process for a set of memory pages allows the
adversary to track the sequence of executed memory pages, thus
potentially leaking secret data processed by the enclave. This attack
works at 4KB granularity, yet sufficient to recover some secrets on
low granularity targets as detailed below.
Experiment setup. To track the sequence of executed memory pages
of an enclave, we used the SGX-Step framework proposed byVan Bulck
et al. [46] and integrated into the Graphene-SGX framework [41].
Graphene-SGX allows running unmodified code inside an Intel SGX
enclave, providing a straightforward approach to execute NSS code
in an enclave and assess its SCA resistance. It is worth noting the
Graphene-SGX framework is not a requirement for the attack, it just
simplifies porting NSS to SGX. We performed our experiments on
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS running on a desktop workstation featuring an
Intel i7-7700 microprocessor (Kaby Lake) with Intel SGX enabled.
TheNSS (private) function ec_compute_wNAF computes thewNAF
encoding. Figure 4 shows a snippet of this function, consisting of a
main loop that encodes k into its wNAF representation, which is
stored in out. In our build this snippet compiles to 363 bytes, hence
much smaller than a memory page; however its callees are located
on different pages.
The execution flow of this function is related to the wNAF repre-
sentation of k to different degrees. For instance, it is easy to verify
the results of conditions at lines 3 and 4 allows retrieving the indices
of the non-zero coefficients of the wNAF representation. A further
analysis revealed it is also possible to extract the sign of these coef-
ficients, by inferring the condition result at line 11. This additional
information will reduce lattice computation time to recover ECDSA
keys as shown in Section 9. Note that this sign leakage is due to
NSS API mp_sub_d only supporting unsigned digits as commented
in Figure 4. This is just another example that the implementation
has the final word regarding SCA (cf. Algorithm 1).
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1 i = 0;
2 /* Compute wNAF form */
3 while (mp_cmp_z(&k) > 0) {
4 if (mp_isodd(&k)) {
5 out[i] = MP_DIGIT(&k, 0) & mask;
6 if (out[i] >= twowm1)
7 out[i] -= 2 * twowm1;
8
9 /* Subtract off out[i]. Note
mp_sub_d only works with↪→
10 * unsigned digits */
11 if (out[i] >= 0) {
12 mp_sub_d(&k, out[i], &k);
13 } else {
14 mp_add_d(&k, -(out[i]), &k);
15 }
16 } else {
17 out[i] = 0;
18 }
19 mp_div_2(&k, &k);
20 i++;
21 }
Figure 4: NSS wNAF encoding function snippet.
Table 3: Functions of interest and tracked pages.
Function Memory page
ec_compute_wNAF 0x08000
mp_isodd 0x1f000
mp_add_d, mp_sub_d 0x22000
s_mp_cmp_d 0x24000
Table 3 shows the relation between functions of interest for SCA
and the tracked memory pages we used to record the execution flow
of ec_compute_wNAF. The first three memory pages allow extract-
ing the unsigned non-zero coefficients of the wNAF representation,
while additionally tracking s_mp_cmp_d allows sign recovery.
The memory page sequence of mp_add_d and mp_sub_d are al-
most identical. However, a subtle difference allows distinguishing
them. mp_sub_d call trace reveals s_mp_cmp_d executes more times
in mp_sub_d than in mp_add_d, making it a good s_mp_cmp_d dis-
tinguisher to determine the condition result at line 11 in Figure 4.
We developed an SGX enclave that generates ECDSA signatures
using curve secp384r1 through NSS pk1sign. We targeted this
enclave collecting 1000 traces while tracking the memory pages in
Table 3. Using the ground truth private key, we verified the non-
zero coefficient signs of the nonce wNAF representation used to
generate those signatures were perfectly recovered in all cases. As
detailed in Section 9.2, after applying lattice cryptanalysis we were
able to recover the private key with very high probability.
8 LEAKING RSA KEYS THROUGH EMA
We now present another EM attack: exploiting the BEEA algorithm
during RSA key generation. During NSS RSA key generation, the
function RSA_PrivateKeyCheck makes two calls to the vulnerable
function mp_gcd to validate if the public exponent e is relatively
prime to p − 1 and q − 1.
Threat model. Our attack utilizes a single EM trace to recover the
private key, since the attacker only gets one shot at the key. Hence
our model assumes the attacker can either trigger RSA key genera-
tion or knows when it occurs. The threat model is otherwise the
same as in Section 6.
Experiment setup. For capturing EM traces during RSA key genera-
tion, we use the same setup and target device described in Section 6.
8.1 Signal Acquisition and Processing
Using the NSS certutil tool, we issued self signed certificates
requesting a fresh 2048-bit RSA key pair each time, while ensuring
sync with the oscilloscope’s signal capture window. We logged the
key metadata and the corresponding EM traces for further analysis
and key recovery. We captured 1100 independent traces and used
100 as a training set to adjust signal processing and error correction
phases of the attack. The remaining 1000 are left to present statistics
of the proposed attack (Section 8.3).
To increase the success rate of key recovery, we preprocessed the
traces to remove high frequency noise and detect noise sources such
as interrupts. We applied low pass filter followed by a digital Hilbert
transform. We then moved on to extracting p and q traces from
the entire key generation trace. By applying templates obtained
from two distinctive patterns, at the start of the first and the end of
the second GCD computation, we extracted the signal of interest.
Finally to cut the traces into p and q, we used the fact that the signal
mean changes abruptly when the second GCD computation starts,
creating a distinctive dip in the trace.
After the trace preprocessing, we selected a single trace to serve
as a template. We divided this template trace into 17 windows
(cf. Figure 5). For each window we used peak extraction to identify
SUBS operations along the trace, while the distance between those
peaks relates to the number of SHIFTS operations between two
SUBS. The distance between peaks is decreasing along the trace, as
operations require less and less time as the integers u and v from
Algorithm 3 decrease in magnitude. For each window we create
a linear regression model that relates the distance between peaks
with the number of SHIFTS operations produced between two SUBS
operations. This way, the unit distance for a SHIFT operation is
not the same for different windows, and we empirically found 17
to be the minimum number of windows containing the maximum
possible number of peaks, for linear regression models to accurately
relate distances with SHIFT operations. Once the 17 models are
generated, it is possible to select any trace, cut it in 17 windows
with the same number of peaks within them and recover the entire
sequence of operations made by the BEEA, applying the regression
model corresponding to each window.
In a noise-free scenario, using the whole sequence of SHIFTS
and SUBS it is possible to recover the primes [4, 5]. However, due
to the noisy nature of EMA, errors possibly exist in the recovered
sequences for p and q. Therefore, instead of trying to recover the
full sequence we aimed to recover a partial one with sufficient
information to retrieve a prime. Coppersmith [15] proposed an
algebraic approach that allows to recover about half the bits of a
prime knowing the other half employing lattice methods. Using
[15], Aldaya et al. [5] showed it was practically possible to recover a
1024-bit prime knowing its 522 least significant bits with very high
probability in less than 10 minutes. Therefore, we adopted a similar
approach to [5], taking into account its lattice implementation is
open source. In what follows we treat this lattice-based cryptanal-
ysis as a lattice oracle that takes 522 bits of a prime as input and
outputs the remaining bits. Following established leakage models of
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Figure 5: Window selected from a random trace. SUBS op-
erations represented by peaks and SHIFTS by the distance
among them.
the BEEA [3, 5], for recovering t bits we need to recover a sequence
such that the number of total SHIFTS is at least t . This implies
we need to gather about half a trace (i.e., t = 522), considerably
reducing the influence of noise.
8.2 Error Correction of Noisy RSA Keys
In each key generation, the function mp_gcd executes for both
(e,p − 1) and (e,q − 1), thus we have two traces per key generated.
Hence two shots to recover one of the secret primes, p or q, needed
to compute the private key.We address the problem of retrieving the
bits from the recovered sequence using two different approaches.
The first approach consists of trying to retrieve the prime using
only the recovered sequence from the trace corresponding to a
single prime, with a classical brute force mechanism.
Our linear regression models can make different mistakes during
the task of retrieving the SHIFTS count between SUBS peaks, and
a single error could lead to incorrect recovery of the secret prime.
For that reason, it is necessary to detect components that give hints
indicating error due to the way they were determined.
Error modeling. During our sequence recovery process we noticed
there are three frequent error types: (i) The model finds a distance
corresponding to 0 SHIFTS between two SUBS operations, which
is a contradiction; thus, we delete that component from the vector,
and consider the surrounding components susceptible to error. This
normally happens because the acquisition of the peak is not clean,
and we find in the trace two peaks extremely near to one another,
that actually should be represented by only one peak. (ii) The model
recovers the number of SHIFT operations from linear regression and
requires rounding. As the fractional part nears 0.5 the model can
decide incorrectly—we consider every component with its fractional
part in the range [0.3, 0.5] to be error-susceptible. Finally, (iii) we
noticed that for high SHIFTS count the regression model accuracy
decreases. This is due to the fact that a higher number of SHIFTS
is increasingly improbable, so we had considerably less samples
of high SHIFTS count during the procedure to generate our linear
regression models. For this reason, we consider every component
finding a SHIFTS count exceeding 8 to be error-susceptible.
To fix these potential errors, we propose the following correc-
tions: (i) Modify the component by ±1, allowing three possibilities
for each component (counting the original retrieved); (ii) Modify
the component by ±1 depending if the rounding operation leads to
the next or previous natural number (two possibilities); (iii) Mod-
ify the component by +1 and +2 (three possibilities) since, from
an analysis done in the training set, we found the model tends to
underestimate the real value when the SHIFT count between two
peaks is relatively high.
Finally, it is important to note that our model is not able to
retrieve the first iterations of the algorithm, i.e., the SHIFTS and
SUBS operations are unknown during these iterations. However,
we observed that no more than four SUBS operations were lost
at the beginning of the sequence. For that reason, we consider all
possible combinations of lost SUBS operations up to four and up to
six SHIFTS12 between SUBS, leading to a total of
∑4
z=0 6
z = 1555
possibilities to recover the leading sequence of SHIFTS and SUBS
operations.
Feasible exhaustive search error correction. Concerning the brute
force procedure, we used the training set to recover statistics about
the worst case computational cost of this approach. Note in this
approach the attacker has two shots per trace to recover the first 522
bits of a prime. After our analysis, we verified that all traces suffer
from missing iterations at the beginning, therefore the attacker
needs 1555 calls to the lattice oracle to succeed in the worst case.
At the same time, we successfully retrieved 14 out of 100 keys
with this low computational cost—the recovered trace matched the
ground truth sans the missing iterations. Generally, considering
a low computational cost adversary (i.e., less than 17 error hints)
it is feasible to recover 51 out of 100 private keys using only the
bruteforce approach. In the first row, Table 4 gives the statistics
about the associated worst case computational costs. However,
beyond these numbers, we highlight it is feasible for an adversary
to solve this problem using an exhaustive search approach.
Combined error correction. It is also possible to exploit the leak
redundancy in the EM traces ofp andq, combining them to fix errors.
This is a common technique to recover noisy RSA keys, useful in
our scenario considering the noisy nature of an EM side-channel
attack. It was first introduced by Percival [34] and later extended
and formalized by Heninger and Shacham [27]. For surveys about
error correction in noisy RSA keys the reader can consult [5, 27, 30].
In our work, we use the approach proposed in [5] due to the sim-
ilarity between the error types handled there and our observations.
Their error correction approach belongs to the binary extend-and-
prune algorithm class.Where, in our RSA context we obtain a binary
sequence that represents the execution flow as explained in Sec-
tion 8.1. However, despite reusing their algorithm we use it in a
different scenario not originally considered, which we expand on
during the experimental evaluation.
A binary extend-and-prune algorithm for fixing errors in RSA
keys processes noisy binary sequences expanding them to a set of
candidates considering possible error sources: (i) error at pi , (ii)
error at qi , (iii) error at both pi and qi , (iv) no error at all. This
expand process ensures that the relation N = pq mod 2i holds,
where i represents the sequence index. Avoiding candidate space
explosion requires a prune procedure.
The prune approach proposed in [5] is to use a set of filters over
the candidates, e.g., hard limiting the number of candidates that will
not be pruned, total number of errors since start (i.e., promoting
those candidates with less errors since start). For a full description
on the filters employed we refer the reader to [5]. In our work
we used an unmodified version of the error correction algorithm
employed in [5].
12Higher values are possible, but increasingly improbable.
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This algorithm could output a maximum of 150k candidates
per trace, indicating that a ranking would be useful to reduce the
number of calls to the lattice oracle. This algorithm incorporates
a candidate enumeration approach that, according to the experi-
ments in [5], ranks the correct solution at first position with high
probability.
8.3 Extended Experiment Results
For this extended experiment we used 1000 EM traces as described
in Section 8.1. From each of these traces we extracted the sequences
of SHIFTS and SUBS corresponding to the processing of p and q.
We used the training set to adjust the combined error correction
algorithm, comparing observed trace recovery with the ground
truth. Hence we decided to use the same configuration employed
in [5].
As described during the exhaustive search approach for solving
errors in p or q, it is common that traces lack information about
the first iterations, also in some of them recovering an additional
iteration. These errors cannot be handled by this error correction
algorithm, therefore implying a failed recovery [5].
In our training set, the number of missing iterations ranges from
zero to four. A straightforward approach to solve this was explained
in Section 8.2, generating 1555 candidates per prime trace. There-
fore, considering the traces of p and q the number of candidates
exploded to 15552 ≈ 221. It is then possible to launch the error
correction algorithm and see which one gives a solution. How-
ever, while this method is feasible, we decided to explore another
approach that considerably reduces the number of candidates.
Instead of exhaustive searching the number of missing leading
iterations and the SHIFTS count inside them, we bruteforce only
the iteration count and fix SHIFTS in all missing iterations to one. It
is likely these filled iterations contain errors, but our hypothesis is
the error correction algorithm will be able to fix them automatically.
With this approach the number of candidates reduces from 221 to
25.
Due to this considerable reduction, in addition to attempting to
solve missing iterations we decided to handling cases where traces
have an additional leading iteration. Removing the first iteration
and treating it as a missing one gives a total of 36 traces per original
trace. This approach was not considered in [5], where the authors
confirmed that 30% of their traces have missing information at the
beginning, but did not solve it—a gap our work fills.
We tested this approach on the training set, obtaining a success
rate of 64%. After manually inspecting the training set, we observed
a maximum success rate of 67/100 using this combined error cor-
rection algorithm. In that sense, 64/67 is sufficiently high for our
purposes.
One interesting feature is the algorithm spends considerably less
time processing a trace with the correct number of iterations at
the beginning compared to incorrect. This is important because the
computing time is one good indicator if there is a solution in the
processed trace. This allows us to quickly detect which trace out of
the 36 has the correct fix for the missing iterations.
After this training, we applied this procedure with the same
configuration parameters in a large set to estimate the success
rate of the full attack. Fixing the number of bits to recover to 522,
Table 4: Number of calls to the lattice oracle.
Method Min Median Mean Max
Bruteforce 1555 222 226 230
Combined 1 1 3 720
we expanded 1k traces on their 36 candidates each and executed
the error correction algorithm on all of them (36k) limiting the
computing time to 15 min per trace. The results are as follows: 587
traces terminated in time and after recovering the remaining bits
using well-known lattice techniques, we recovered 565 independent
RSA-2048 private keys. The number of calls to the lattice oracle
had an impressive median of one while achieving a success rate of
56.5%. Table 4 shows more statistics about this method.
Data show in Table 4 demonstrates that an EM attack on binary
GCD algorithms is a real threat to SoC devices. This table is not
about comparing two approaches: rather providing experimental
data of attack feasibility using different methods, where both have
room for improvements.
9 ENDGAME: LATTICE-BASED ANALYSIS
ECDSA and DSA signing both return a pair (r , s) such that
s · k ≡ h + α · r mod q (6)
where α , h, and k correspond with the private key, hash, and nonce.
Additionally, the integer r coincides with the output of a proce-
dure that performs an exponentiation (DSA, Equation 1) or point
multiplication (ECDSA, Equation 2). The vulnerabilities in Sec-
tion 4–Section 7 provide varying degrees of leakage for each nonce,
and in this section we utilize that for lattice-based cryptanalysis.
The private key recovery problem reduces to a Shortest Vector
Problem (SVP) or Closest Vector Problem (CVP) instance of a given
lattice. In both SVP and CVP instances, one proceeds by reducing
the lattice with the LLL or BKZ procedures; the next step is looking
for a short or close vector on the lattice, respectively. However, any
CVP instance with input lattice B and vector u can be mapped into
an SVP instance by looking for a short lattice basis vector in the
lattice
Bˆ =
[
B ®0
®u q
]
(7)
In this section, we focused on constructing a suitable CVP instance,
i.e., the lattice B and vector ®u.
9.1 DSA Endgame: Lattice Attack
In Section 4 we analyzed a timing vulnerability and then we col-
lected traces containing a variable amount of bits leaked during
DSA signature generation—we now show the lattice formalization
enabling private key recovery.
Lattice construction. Assume we have a sample of size N and el-
ements of the form (ωi , ri , si ,hi ) where ωi is the elapsed time of
signing a message with hash hi and signature (ri , si ) satisfying
Equation 6. Next, one proceeds by sorting the sample according to
ωi and retaining the f ≪ N fastest ones, expected to correspond
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with shorter-than-average nonces. After filtering, the next step is
to construct a suitable lattice that allows private key recovery.
Recall, in the filtered sample each nonce ki should have bit length
smaller than or equal tom = lg(q), and then ki < q/2ℓi for some
positive integer ℓi . Moreover, the inequalityhi/si+α ·ri/si mod q =
ki < q/2ℓi is crucial because it ensures the existence of integers
λi ∈ {−q . .q} such that α · (2Wi ·ti )−(2Wi ·uˆi +q)−(2Wi ·λi ·q) ≤ q
where ti = ri/si mod q, uˆi = −hi/si mod q, andWi = 2ℓi . To be
more precise, withd ≪ N a positive integer, the dimensional-(d+1)
lattice
B =

2W1 · q 0 · · · · · · 0
0 2W2 · q
. . . · · ·
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 2Wd · q 0
2W1 · t1 2W2 · t2 · · · 2Wd · td 1

(8)
and the integer vectors ®u = (2W1 · uˆ1 + q, . . . , 2Wd · uˆd + q, 0),
®z = (λ1, . . . , λd ,α), and ®y = (2W1 · ν1, . . . , 2Wd · νd ,α) satisfy
®zB − ®u = ®y with νi ∈ {−(q − 1)/2 . . (q − 1)/2} the signed modular
reduction of uˆi + q/(2Wi ) mod q.
Lattice parameters. Feasible private key recovery depends on lattice
parameters N , f , and d . Recall, N determines the number of mea-
sured signatures, and each signature requires a nonce ki randomly
and uniformly drawn from {1 . .q− 1}. Notice the expected number
of nonces with ℓ MSBs clear is approximately N /2ℓ . Our goal is
to determine the expected number of MSBs clear for each nonce
corresponding with the filtered sample size f .
Denote ℓ the number of clear MSBs for the dimensional-(d + 1)
lattice construction. Each column of the lattice has ℓ correlated bits
to the private key and, assuming the private key hasm bits, the
expected number of independent bits in a sub-sample of size d is
m · (1 − (1 − ℓ/m)d ) 13. Then setting d = c ·m/ℓ, the probability
that a random sub-sample of size d hasm independent correlated
bits is 1 − (1 − ℓ/m)d ≈ 1 − e−c and c = 1.25 is enough to ensure
a “small” lattice dimension and success probability of at most 0.71.
Hence we set c = 1.25 in what follows.
Increasing f decreases the expected number of clearMSBs, hence
the best configuration is to set f = δ · d ≈ d with δ ∈ (1, 2] and
f = N /2θ where θ = lg(N )+ lg(ℓ)− lg(m)− lg(1.25 ·δ ). Finally, the
existence of noise in the measurements necessitates a certain degree
of freedom for the number of clear MSBs. Recall, θ is the expected
number of clear MSBs (for noise-free measurements) and ℓ is the
fixed number of clear MSB’s to be used, and therefore the quantity
θ−ℓ gives an idea of howmuch large ℓ can be for a fixed sample size
N . Figure 6 illustrates the degree of freedom assuming ℓ ∈ {4 . . 11}
and different sample sizes. Section 9.3 shows experiment results
for the lattice applied to our collected samples during the remote
timing attack scenario.
13Each correlation can be viewed as an ℓ-tuple with entries determined by the bit
positions of the private key that are correlated. Thus, the number of different positions
in a sample of d tuples with entries in {0 . .m − 1} will determine the number of
independent bits.
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Figure 6: The x-axis corresponds with the number ℓ clear
MSBs used, while the y-axis determines the quantity θ − ℓ
where θ = lg(N ) + lg(ℓ) − lg(m) − lg(1.25 · δ ) is the expected
number of clear MSBs in the filtered sample. Sample sizes
are log scale.
9.2 ECDSA Endgame: Lattice Attack
This section describes two kinds of lattice constructions, depending
on the SCA nature. Unsigned applies to signals where point subtrac-
tions cannot be distinguished from point additions during wNAF
point multiplication (cf. Section 6). Signed is a stronger attack in
the sense that point subtractions can be distinguished, yielding the
sign of each wNAF representation coefficient (cf. Section 7). The
lattice constructions utilizing said leakage are based on those of
van de Pol et al. [48] and Allan et al. [6], respectively, summarized
as follows. With wNAF window widthw , knowing the position of
two consecutive non-zero coefficients κj and κj+ℓ leads to an equa-
tion with z α-correlated bits. Moreover, each column of the lattice
B is determined by the pair (κj ,κj+ℓ) along with public values h
and (r , s).
In addition, Equation 8 describes B but having t = r · s−1 ·
2m−j−ℓ−1 mod q, W = 2z where z = ℓ − w and z = ℓ − w +
1 for the unsigned and signed approaches, respectively. In both
approaches, ®u has the same shape like in the timing attack but
without the term q, and either: (i) u˜ = 2m+w−ℓ−1 − (h · s−1 +
2j+w − 2j+ℓ) · 2m−j−ℓ−1 mod q for the unsigned case; or (ii) u˜ =
(2b + 1) · 2m+w−ℓ−2 − (h · s−1 · 2m−j−ℓ−1) mod q, where b denotes
the sign of the coefficient κj+ℓ for the signed case.
Remark. The above equations are assuming each coefficient κj in
the wNAF representation of k satisfies −2w < κj < 2w . However,
our case study uses a modified wNAF representation such that
−2w−1 < κj < 2w−1; that is, replacingw withw − 1.
Déjà Vu: Side-Channel Analysis of Mozilla’s NSS
9.3 Lattices at Work
To illustrate the practical implications of SVP instances used for
private key recovery, we implemented our lattice-based cryptanaly-
sis in Python 3. After constructing the dimensional-(d + 2) lattice Bˆ
from Equation 7, we proceed by applying the method by Gama et al.
[21]. The main idea is to reduce (using BKZ) another dimensional-
(d + 2) lattice B˜ which is computed by shuffling the columns of Bˆ
and multiplying it by a unimodular matrix with low density ap-
proximately equal to (d +√d). The goal is looking for a short lattice
basis vector in the reduced lattice of B˜: if private key recovery is
unsuccessful, update Bˆ as the reduced matrix of B˜ and repeat the
procedure. Finally, our implementation solves the corresponding
SVP instance with help of the BKZ reduction included in fpylll14,
a Python wrapper for the fplll C++ library [17].
We focused our experiments on private key recovery for DSA
and ECDSA procedures with a 224-bit and 384-bit q, respectively.
Each experiment consisted of the following steps: (i) select a ran-
dom sample of size N from the SCA data; (ii) construct a random
dimensional-(d+2) lattice Bˆ; (iii) look for a short lattice basis vector
in Bˆ allowing private key recovery; goto (ii) if unsuccessful.
We labeled an experiment successful when recovering the private
key according to the above steps and fixing the maximum lattice
constructions to correspond to roughly 4 h of wall clock single core
CPU time. The experiments with 224-bit DSA instances assume
ℓ = 4 clear MSBs and use the suitable lattice dimension proposed
in Section 9.1. On the another hand, experiments corresponding
with 384-bit ECDSA have a different lattice nature not determined
in terms of clear MSBs but by the distances between two non-
zero wNAF coefficients. However, our lattice dimension choices
are based on the analysis given in Section 9.1 and, because of the
reduced sample size compared to the DSA case, we increased the
lattice dimension until reaching a (possible) high success probability.
The signed wNAF trace approach ensures one more leakage bit
and smaller sample sizes with a higher success probability than the
(unsigned) wNAF trace approach. For both 224-bit DSA and 384-bit
ECDSA, the small density of about (d +√d) permits (at each step in
the method by Gama et al. [21]) the use of a “random” lattice with
small difference from the reduced one, and thus the BKZ reduction
cost is minimized. In other words, we observe our choice (d + √d)
allows a large number of different lattices in a fixed yet reasonable
amount of time, and therefore the success probability increase.
Additionally, the random samples used in 224-bit DSA instances
correspond with the data obtained by the remote timing attacks
presented in Section 4. Conversely, the random samples used in the
(unsigned) wNAF traces of 384-bit ECDSA instances are the ones
obtained by the EM-based analysis presented in Section 6. As far as
we known, this is first application of multi-digit lattice methods to
EM-based signals. And finally, the random samples corresponding
to signed wNAF traces of 384-bit ECDSA instances were obtained
by the analysis from Section 7.
To have a better understanding how practice meets theory, we
measured the elapsed time and number of random lattices required
in each successful experiment. Table 5 summarizes the average
elapsed time (in minutes) and the portion of successful experiments
over all 1000 runs. Additionally, Table 5 also ilustrates the minimum,
14https://github.com/fplll/fpylll
maximum, median, mean, and standard deviation of the number
of lattice constructions performed. Moreover, from Table 5 we can
see that our improvements bring us a success probability of 0.38
(with sample size 1152) for 224-bit DSA, 0.14 and 0.83 (both with
sample size 30) for wNAF traces and wNAF signed traces of 384-bit
ECDSA respectively.
Attack N d + 2 Min Max Median Mean Stdev Time Ratio
2048
78
1 1374 25 59.9 102.4 0.3 0.99
Timing 1536 1 4826 6 48.9 255.7 0.1 0.99
(Section 4) 1280 1 10169 6 67.4 450.1 0.1 0.74
1152 1 10726 7 148.3 839.9 0.1 0.38
40 92 1 2522 77 273.5 492.4 2.1 0.11
40 132 1 50 2 4.9 7.9 0.9 0.09
wNAF 40 172 1 158 2 7.1 19.4 1.3 0.08
(Section 6) 30 92 5 3673 522 781.4 872.7 14.5 0.05
30 132 1 1855 130 306.3 407.1 9.8 0.14
30 172 1 2008 173 322.6 425.0 22.1 0.13
40 92 1 2725 35 197.4 425.4 1.0 0.92
wNAF, 30 92 1 2814 357 641.9 711.6 7.7 0.23
error-free 30 132 1 1969 178 370.5 442.8 13.6 0.73
(Section 6) 20 132 47 1616 646 671.8 524.8 47.5 0.02
20 172 2 1617 771 792.6 517.1 97.5 0.02
40 92 1 2817 3 80.2 277.4 0.3 0.94
wNAF, 30 92 1 2854 101 430.5 672.6 2.4 0.44
signed 30 132 1 840 13 76.2 145.1 1.9 0.83
(Section 7) 20 132 1 1893 363 569.3 622.3 18.5 0.03
20 172 4 2127 663 782.7 643.7 64.2 0.04
Table 5: Minimum, maximum, median, mean, and standard
deviation of the number of lattice constructions performed.
Timings are in minutes, and correspond with the median of
the successful experiments.
10 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an extensive SCA security evaluation
of Mozilla’s NSS—from discovering vulnerabilities to performing
key recovery attacks. To identify potential SCA leaks, we com-
bined an automated leakage assessment framework DATA and the
Triggerflow tool to identify the resulting leaks using during NSS in-
vocations of DSA, ECDSA and RSA using DATA and track the code
paths that lead to them using Triggerflow. The results led to the
discovery of some serious SCA security flaws in DSA and ECDSA
nonce padding, ECDSA point multiplication and scalar encoding
as well as RSA key generation. To demonstrate real-world secu-
rity impact, we also performed several end-to-end attacks at the
application level—remote timing attack on DSA (research data re-
leased [44] in support of Open Science), microarchitecture attack on
ECDSA nonce encoding, EM attack on ECDSA point multiplication
and EM attack on RSA key generation. Finally, we summarized the
results of different lattice formulations used during key recovery
phase of the attacks. Interestingly, the discovered vulnerabilities are
known to the research community and previously reported across
multiple vendors (e.g., OpenSSL), which highlights a gap in the
practice of CVE coordination among peer vendors.
Cui bono? NSS is certainly neither the first nor last security library
to fall prey to SCA and failure to use constant-time implementa-
tions. Why is this a recurring event? Who should be held culpable?
We note the break, fix, break cycle benefits several stakeholders due
to perverse incentives—to mention a few: (i) it keeps software engi-
neers in demand since these libraries are not “deploy and forget”;
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(ii) it keeps security engineers in demand since there is a steady
stream of security issues to assess and address; (iii) it keeps security
researchers busy with a perpetual flow of research topics to write
papers about—including us. During judgment, the ancient Romans
inquired Cui bono? or “Who benefits?” to identify suspects. Perhaps
the incomplete list of key players above in this self-perpetuating
meta-system is a good start.
Mitigations. During responsible disclosure to Mozilla, we made
several FOSS contributions to assist in mitigating these issues and
testing the fixes—all of which are now merged. (i) To solve the vul-
nerability in Section 4 (CVE-2020-12399), we proposed a patch15 to
NSS that randomizes the nonce by kˆ = k +b ·q where b is a random
wordwith a fixed bit length, i.e., top bit set. Our empirical evaluation
of the patch indicates this aligns the curves in Figure 1, mitigating
the issue. (ii) For the vulnerability in Section 8 (CVE-2020-12402),
we implemented16 the constant-time GCD and modular inversion
by Bernstein and Yang [11]. (iii) For the Section 6 and Section 7 vul-
nerabilities (CVE-2020-6829), we decided against patching wNAF
and, similar to the secp256r1 code in NSS, proposed two custom
ECGroupStr for secp384r117 and secp521r118. We leveraged EC-
CKiila19 for this task [9], built on top of fiat-crypto20 to take
advantage of its formally verified and constant-time GF layer [19].
(iv) With these constant-time versions in place and NSS not fea-
turing any other vulnerable curves, the broken fix in Section 5
(CVE-2020-12401) is no longer needed—hence we submitted a patch
to remove the padding21.
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